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I. INTRODUCTION
Glynn Lunney’s recent book Copyright’s Excess: Money and Music
in the Recording Industry provides many important, even stunning in-
sights about copyright law and policy, primarily from the standpoint of
economic analysis. To highlight just one example of many, Lunney
does an outstanding job assembling data to support a core assertion—
more money does not mean more music. In fact, according to his re-
search, more money empirically means less music. Consider the intro-
duction to Chapter Seven, in which Lunney observes:
In the previous chapters, we found that for the recording industry
from 1962 through 2015, copyright’s fundamental premise did not
hold. More copyright led to a sharp increase in revenues from the
sale of recorded music, but more revenue did not lead to more and
better music. To the contrary, it led to less. Moreover, the data
reveals precisely why: as revenues increased, earnings for our top
artists rose sharply; as they did, our top artists started producing
fewer hit songs. Only when revenues and earnings began to fall in
DOI: https://doi.org/10.37419/JPL.V6.I1.3
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the post-file-sharing era did the productivity of our top artists begin
to pick up again.2
He further claims that if musical artists retire after banking a specific
amount of money, they very well may choose to work only as hard as
accumulating that desired level of wealth requires. Lunney noted that
if a copyright regime enabled an artist to earn that sum by recording
fifty successful songs, then that artist might rationally decide to retire
after recording and releasing fifty songs. If a copyright system enabled
an artist to earn the desired sum of money for recording a single suc-
cessful song, then that might be the only song the artist produces.3
It remains unclear whether motivating high-earning, successful art-
ists to create more works (by shrinking their incomes), or motivating
them to retire (by enhancing their incomes) to make room at the top
for other artists is the way to increase the overall level of production
of good music. The impact that current copyright laws have on the
number of recording artists who are able to fully support themselves
by authoring copyrighted sound recordings is similarly opaque. Yet
without Lunney drawing attention to the economic dynamics of the
music industry as he did, one might not even think of these questions,
no less attempt a search for answers.
In the context of making policy recommendations, Lunney ex-
plained that copyright owners will perpetually lobby Congress to alter
copyright laws to transfer wealth from consumers to themselves.4 He
noted: “Fortunately, in politics it is much easier to prevent Congress
from acting than to get Congress to act.”5 He further (and very as-
tutely) observed that copyright owners will also continually avail
themselves of any venue available to them, including the courts. Addi-
tionally, they will try to persuade European actors to expand copy-
right, and then “argue harmonization or trade-related interests to
persuade Congress to grant them the same protection in the United
States.”6
II. THE TIME FOR OVERALL COPYRIGHT REFORM IS NIGH
One of the most important contributions that Copyright’s Excess
makes is to demonstrate very convincingly that copyright law as a
whole needs fresh analysis and rethinking. It has been almost a quar-
ter of a century since the United States Congress enacted the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, which among other initiatives established
the “notice and take down” paradigm that provides a safe harbor from
copyright infringement liability for website owners that remove mate-
2. GLYNN LUNNEY, COPYRIGHT’S EXCESS: MONEY AND MUSIC IN THE RECORD-
ING INDUSTRY 193 (2018).
3. Id. at 193–94.
4. Id. at 197.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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rial that copyright holders allege to be an infringement.  It has been
over twenty years since passage of the Copyright Term Extension Act,
which increased copyright terms retroactively as well as prospectively.
Supplementing Congressional action, mainly to wrangle doctrinal
lapses and ambiguities, the United States Supreme Court has dis-
rupted previous copyright law understandings in cases like: M.G.M.
Studios v. Grokster,7 which added “inducing infringement” as a cate-
gory of secondary liability for copyright infringement; Kirtsaeng v.
John Wiley and Sons, Inc.,8 which extended the “first sale doctrine” to
copyrighted works lawfully made abroad; American Broadcasting
Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc.,9 which expanded the definition of “public
performance” by analogizing the Internet broadcasting of copyright-
able audiovisual works to cable retransmission; and Star Athletica,
LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc.,10 which established a new test for deter-
mining the copyrightability of pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works
that are “useful articles.”  Parties who are unhappy with these juris-
prudential developments want Congress to legislatively undo them.
Parties that benefited from these changes want Congress to codify
them by amending the Copyright Act. Lunney is correct to be con-
cerned that some of these parties’ lobbying initiatives will gain trac-
tion and change the law without considering how this alters incentives
for various stakeholders.
There are other signs that pressure is building for significant new
copyright law reforms as well. One powerful indication is that the
American Law Institute (“ALI”) is producing a Restatement of Copy-
right Law,11 something this author recommended in 200512 and again
in 2014.13 Given the controversy this project has engendered,14 ALI is
unlikely to explicitly include Lunney’s recommendations in any signif-
icant way within the rules of this Restatement. Though some invested
parties accuse the drafters of promulgating radical change, the final
version of the Restatement of Copyright is unlikely to be revolution-
7. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
8. See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519 (2013).
9. See American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. 431
(2014).
10. See Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017).
11. See Restatement of the Law, Copyright, THE AM. L. INST., https://www.ali.org/
projects/show/copyright/ (last visited Aug. 31, 2019).
12. Ann Bartow, The Hegemony of the Copyright Treatise, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 3
(2004).
13. Ann Bartow, A Restatement of Copyright Law as More Independent and Stable
Treatise, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 457, 498 (2014).
14. See e.g. Terry Hart, Clearing the Air on the ALI Copyright Restatement, COPY-
RIGHT ALL. BLOGS (Jan. 19, 2018), https://copyrightalliance.org/ca_post/ali-copyright-
restatement/ [https://perma.cc/CR6X-EYP6]; Scott Alan Burroughs, ALI’s Great
Copyright Caper: Has The American Law Institute Been Hijacked by Big Tech?,
ABOVE THE L. (Jan. 24, 2018, 6:15 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2018/01/alis-great-
copyright-caper-has-the-american-law-institute-been-hijacked-by-big-tech/ [https://
perma.cc/MYA7-XJ82].
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ary. It would be encouraging to find references to Lunney’s research
mentioned in appropriate related ALI commentaries, but we shall see
if this happens.
Another barometric signal of copyright law change is the ramped-
up visibility and copyright advocacy of public interest NGOs such as
the Electronic Frontier Foundation,15 Public Knowledge,16 the Au-
thors Alliance,17 the Center for Democracy and Technology,18 and the
Organization for Transformative Works,19 which generally work to
make information more accessible. While the NGOs define them-
selves as pro-consumer, they are sometimes accused of working on
behalf of “big tech,” which has a low barriers copyright agenda of its
own.
Not all of the reforms proposed by these organizations will meet
with Lunney’s approval. For example, Public Knowledge is in favor of
“extending full, federal copyright protection to pre-1972 sound re-
cordings, including 95 year term limits [and] [s]upporting the creation
of a federal public performance right for terrestrial AM/FM radio.”20
Lunney argues that the sound recording copyright should be abolished
altogether.21
Other NGO proposed initiatives are beyond the scope of Lunney’s
book. The Author’s Alliance is in favor of enhancing the moral rights
of authors through new statutory moral rights legislation.22 Public
Knowledge advocates for changes to the Copyright Act’s statutory
damages regime, asserting:
When a single act may result in damages ranging between $200 and
$150,000 per work infringed, legitimate activities both large and
small are chilled. Whether an individual uploads a parody of a pop
hit, a museum displays an exhibit of orphaned works, or a large
company provides offsite data storage for its customers, each can be
held hostage to potential damages awards that are orders of magni-
tude larger than any actual harm caused to a copyright holder.
Threats of these astronomical damages can affect the landscape
before any dispute even goes to trial, forcing settlements that pre-
15. See ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/search/site/copyright [https:/
/perma.cc/LK5Q-GVJ5] (last visited Aug. 31, 2019) (search results for “copyright”).
16. See Copyright Reform, PUB. KNOWLEDGE, https://www.publicknowledge.org/
issues/copyright-reform/ [https://perma.cc/S562-6GRS] (last visited Aug. 31, 2019).
17. See About Us, AUTHORS ALL., https://www.authorsalliance.org/about/ [https://
perma.cc/SH2H-97GD] (last visited Aug. 31, 2019).
18. See About CDT, CDT, https://cdt.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/GE8R-Q8EJ]
(last visited Aug. 31, 2019).
19. See Legal Advocacy, ORG. FOR TRANSFORMATIVE WORKS, https://www.trans-
formativeworks.org/legal/ [https://perma.cc/QS96-73ZU] (last visited Aug. 31, 2019).
20. See Music Licensing, PUB. KNOWLEDGE, https://www.publicknowledge.org/is
sues/music-licensing [https://perma.cc/5WMV-HE33] (last visited Aug. 31, 2019).
21. See LUNNEY, supra note 2, at 207–08.
22. U.S. Copyright Office Releases Report on Moral Rights, AUTHORS ALL. (Apr.
29, 2019), https://www.authorsalliance.org/2019/04/29/u-s-copyright-office-releases-re
port-on-moral-rights/ [https://perma.cc/GML3-TKKL].
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vent new innovations from seeing the light of day. The United
States should reexamine and reform its current system of statutory
damages, taking into account the current state of technology and
consumer uses, as well as specific circumstances that might call for
mitigating damages.23
The Center for Democracy and Technology seems to concentrate on
copyright law and policy developments in Europe, doing work that
Lunney would likely be in favor of, but focusing on issues such as text
and data mining in the Copyright Directive context.24 The Organiza-
tion for Transformative Works centers its advocacy on fan fiction and
fan culture and all related legal issues, including copyright law.25 The
bedrock upon which its activism is built is a broad construction of fair
use that supports authors who use existing works as the raw material
for their own creative output.26 Lunney’s views seem generally aligned
with this approach: His data and conclusions are less relevant to “not
for profit or commercial distribution” transformative works of
fandom, which likely dominate the genre, than for profit seeking au-
thors and intermediaries. However, his work still provides useful
frameworks for analyzing pertinent economic and legal issues embed-
ded within relationships between incentives and creative output in the
context of fan works.
III. THE CURRENT APPROACH TO TERMINATION RIGHTS
DESPERATELY NEEDS REFORM
The most unnecessarily complicated right the Copyright Act pro-
vides for human authors27 is the right to unilaterally terminate a li-
cense (a.k.a a “grant”) of copyrights after a fixed period of time.  The
theory behind allowing authors (or their statutory heirs if the author is
deceased) to unilaterally terminate a license is to facilitate renegoti-
ation of unfavorable terms and conditions when a work is commer-
cially successful but the author is not sharing in the financial rewards.
For example, someone who signs over the rights to a novel for $10,000
23. Principles for a Balanced Copyright Policy, PUB. KNOWLEDGE (May 21, 2012),
https://www.publicknowledge.org/documents/principles-for-a-balanced-copyright-pol
icy [https://perma.cc/A4JP-VQM7].
24. CDT Joins Open Letter on Text and Data Mining Exception in EU Copyright
Discussions, CDT (Jan. 16, 2019), https://cdt.org/insight/cdt-joins-open-letter-on-text-
and-data-mining-exception-in-eu-copyright-discussions/ [https://perma.cc/VP9K-
SMK8].
25. Legal, TRANSFORMATIVEWORKS.ORG, https://www.transformativeworks.org/
legal/ [https://perma.cc/UC3T-NUAX] (last visited Aug. 31, 2019).
26. Id.
27. Termination rights do not apply to works for hire. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OF-
FICE, WORKS MADE FOR HIRE 4 (2017) https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ30.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F4C6-6MZP]; see also Termination of Transfers and Licenses Under
17 U.S.C. §203, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, https://www.copyright.gov/docs/203.html
[https://perma.cc/AW58-M2LD] (last visited Sept. 6, 2019); see also 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)
(2012).
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today and then watches it generate hundreds of thousands or even
millions of dollars in royalties for the publisher, can unilaterally termi-
nate the agreement under Section 203 or 304(c) & (d) if all the re-
quired conditions are met. After terminating the unfavorable license,
the author can try to negotiate a better deal with either the same pub-
lisher or start fresh with a different one.
For copyrightable works created and fixed after the Copyright Act
of 1976 took effect on January 1, 1978, the termination right is found
in Section 203. It is unwaivable and empowers authors (or their statu-
tory heirs if the author is deceased) to take free of licenses about
thirty-five to forty years after the licenses were executed. The Copy-
right Act explains:
Termination of the grant may be effected at any time during a pe-
riod of five years beginning at the end of thirty-five years from the
date of execution of the grant; or, if the grant covers the right of
publication of the work, the period begins at the end of thirty-five
years from the date of publication of the work under the grant or at
the end of forty years from the date of execution of the grant,
whichever term ends earlier.28
For works predating the enactment of Section 203, human authors (or
their statutory heirs if the author is deceased) can only terminate a
license when they affirmatively renew their copyrights, and then only
if they have not waived this right, as many authors did.29  These termi-
nation rights are found in Sections 304(c) and (d) of the Copyright
Act. Termination of the grants covered by these sections “may be ef-
fected at any time during a period of five years beginning at the end of
fifty-six years from the date copyright was originally secured, or begin-
ning on January 1, 1978, whichever is later.” These termination provi-
sions will eventually sunset in 2034 when all the copyrights secured on
December 31, 1977, or earlier, finally exceed fifty-six years of age.
When evaluating the significance of statutory termination rights,
one can credit Congress with looking out for authors who might other-
wise be completely cut out of the financial windfall garnered by the
distribution of a popular and successful creative work. Yet Congress
made exercising termination rights so complicated and difficult that it
is hard to view this putative solicitude as sincere. Licenses for works
covered by Section 304 almost always contain waivers of termination
rights, and the courts have held that this type of waiver is enforceable
against the author, though generally not against the author’s heirs.
Congress clearly acted in the best interests of authors by making
Section 203 termination rights unwaivable. An author or her statutory
28. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3) (2012).
29. Many, in fact probably close to all, pre-1978 licenses required authors to waive
their Section 304 termination rights. The courts held these waivers enforceable against
the authors, though not against their heirs. See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207,
219–20 (1990).
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heirs can exercise Section 203 termination rights even if the express
terms of the written license say otherwise, and even if the author re-
ceived additional compensation for agreeing to the waiver.  However,
authors who do not know about termination rights, or do not under-
stand that they are unwaivable, cannot exercise them.
Any commercial publisher with access to legal advice likely knows
about termination rights and understands that they are unwaivable.
Yet typical copyright licenses are very likely to contain a provision
that claims the agreement is in effect for the entire duration of the
copyright. This is to trick authors out of asserting their termination
rights. Few authors will know that termination rights are unwaivable
regardless of contract language to the contrary, if they are even aware
of their termination rights at all. The license holder has no obligation
to inform authors about termination rights and every incentive to try
to obscure their very existence. License holders do not want to have to
renegotiate licenses that enrich them or risk losing control over valua-
ble works.
Authors who endeavor to terminate licenses need solid, competent
legal representation to stand a chance at accomplishing termination.
They must serve termination notices on the correct parties, in the cor-
rect form, and at the correct time.30 Failure to do so may result in
closure of a termination window and the continuation of a disadvanta-
geous license through the end of its specified term, which is often the
entire duration of the relevant copyright. Even authors who navigate
all the required steps necessary for the termination of a license may be
unable to successfully complete the termination due to legal pushback
from the license holder.
IV. CAN’T STOP THE SECTION 203 TERMINATION RIGHTS:
THE VICTOR WILLIS STORY
The first wave of Section 203 terminations began in 2013, thirty-five
years after the first wave of copyright licenses after the Copyright Act
of 1976 took effect in 1978.  Among those authors seeking termination
was Victor Willis, who had co-written thirty-three songs, some of
which were made famous by the musical group, The Village People,
with whom Willis performed, dressed in a police uniform.  These
songs included “YMCA,” “Go West,” and “In the Navy.” The license
holder, Can’t Stop Music, fought back aggressively.  Can’t Stop Music
sued Willis to try to prevent termination of the agreement he had
30. See generally Adam Holofcener, The Right to Terminate: A Musicians’ Guide
to Copyright Reversion, FUTURE OF MUSIC COAL. (Feb. 16, 2012), https://futureofmu
sic.org/article/fact-sheet/right-terminate-musicians%E2%80%99-guide-copyright-re
version [https://perma.cc/4PGT-V8MX].
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signed, alleging that Mr. Willis, as one of at least three credited co-
authors, could not unilaterally serve a notice of termination.31
Can’t Stop Music additionally argued that the songs were “works
made for hire”32 because Victor Willis was the company’s employee.
Stewart L. Levy, a lawyer representing Can’t Stop Music, was quoted
as saying at the time: “We hired this guy. He was an employee. We
gave them the material and a studio to record in and controlled what
was recorded, where, what hours and what they did.”33 This claim was
later dropped34 when Can’t Stop Music conceded that all of the origi-
nal copyright registration filings answered “no” to the question on the
form that asked whether it was a work for hire.35
Victor Willis, a very successful songwriter, only knew that he had
termination rights because his spouse, an attorney familiar with copy-
right law, notified him.36 He was also lucky enough to have half a
million dollars at his disposal to spend on lawyers. Ultimately, he pre-
vailed in court and was able to regain control over his copyrights. He
also successfully sued to remove one of the purported co-authors from
some of the disputed songs37 and for reimbursement of his attorney’s
fees.38  In 2015, District Court Judge Barry Ted Moskowitz granted
Willis $527,236 to cover his attorney’s fees and $3,034 in costs incurred
during the multiyear copyright litigation he endured to successfully
exercise his termination rights. Judge Moskowitz wrote:
The Court does find . . . that a grant of attorney’s fees would
advance considerations of compensation and deterrence and would
31. Scorpio Music S.A. v. Willis, No. 11-cv-1557 BTM (RBB), 2012 WL 1598043,
at *2 (S.D. Cal. May 7, 2012).
32. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 27, at 2.
33. Larry Rohter, A Copyright Victory, 35 Years Later, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10,
2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/11/arts/music/a-copyright-victory-35-years-la
ter.html [https://perma.cc/KR3B-EMSY].
34. Eriq Gardner, Music Publisher Drops Key Claim in ‘Y.M.C.A.’ Copyright Ter-




36. Rohter, supra note 33. See also George Varga, Victor Willis on Life & Music,
Post-Village People, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Aug. 2, 2015, 6:00 AM), https://www.
sandiegouniontribune.com/entertainment/music/sdut-victor-willis-interview-2015aug
02-story.html [https://perma.cc/M2HC-NCYQ]; Eriq Gardner, Village People Singer
Victor Willis Breaks Silence about Copyright Lawsuit Win, HOLLYWOOD REP. (May.
11, 2012, 12:04 PM), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/village-people-
victor-willis-copyright-lawsuit-323489 [https://perma.cc/WS3K-DS8P].
37. Eriq Gardner, Jury Decides Village People ‘Y.M.C.A.’ Songwriter has 50 Per-
cent Song Share, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Mar. 05, 2015, 8:39 AM), https://www.hollywood
reporter.com/thr-esq/jury-decides-village-people-ymca-779420 [https://perma.cc/
MLV2-VX4E].
38. Diane Bell, “YMCA” Writer Wins Court Battle, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.
(Sept. 18, 2015, 5:29 PM), https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/entertainment/tv/
sdut-village-people-ymca-victor-willis-lawsuit-fees-won-2015sep18-story.html [https://
perma.cc/WF8H-ECPQ].
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further the purposes of the Copyright Act. Section 203, providing
for the termination of transfers of copyrights, was designed to “safe-
guard [ ] authors against unremunerative transfers” and address
“the unequal bargaining position of authors, resulting in part from
the impossibility of determining a work’s value until it has been ex-
ploited.” H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 124 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5740. Willis is an author who incurred signifi-
cant attorney’s fees in trying to get back what he transferred to
Plaintiffs, parties with superior bargaining power, decades ago. An
award of attorney’s fees is justified to encourage authors like Willis
to assert their rights to regain their copyright interests and to deter
production companies and other transferees of copyright from at-
tempting to interfere with those rights.39
This termination rights saga had a happy ending for Victor Willis but
it is not at all clear that other authors will experience similar triumphs
over seasoned, well-funded corporate intermediaries anxious to retain
control over profitable creative works and are even more determined
not to cut authors into the revenue streams that these works generate.
Composers like Willis may have an advantage because they tend to
write musical compositions alone or in small groups, which may give
them more persuasive claims to authorship.  Recording artists who
turn musical compositions into sound recordings, however, may pro-
duce their works in studios in collaboration with producers, engineers,
and other musicians. This complicates their claims to authorship and
therefore to termination rights.
V. ARE SOUND RECORDINGS WORKS FOR HIRE?
As of this writing, a group of sound recording artists lead by John
Waite is suing Sony and UMG over their refusals to honor termina-
tion notices for sound recordings they authored. The basis of the re-
fusals is primarily an assertion that these songs were recorded as
“works for hire” and therefore ineligible for Section 203 terminations
by the authors.40 The musicians’ complaint alleges in pertinent part:
Waite, Ely, and hundreds of other recording artists, have served No-
tices of Termination upon UMG pursuant to the provisions set forth
39. Scorpio Music S.A. v. Willis, No. 11-cv-1557 BTM (RBB), 2012 WL 1598043 at
7–8 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2015).
40. Sony and UMG are also alleging that because the recording artists had en-
tered into licenses through “loan out” companies for tax purposes, they were not “ex-
ecuted by the author” within the meaning of Section 203(a) which sets out “conditions
for termination.” See generally Scott Alan Burroughs, Terminators, Mount Up!: Sec-
tion 203 and Copyright Recovery (Part 1), ABOVE THE L. (May 15, 2019 3:41 PM),
https://abovethelaw.com/2019/05/terminators-mount-up-section-203-and-copyright-re
covery-part-i/ [https://perma.cc/C8VT-UJ4J]; see also Aaron J. Moss & Kenneth Ba-
sin, Copyright Termination and Loan-Out Corporations: Reconciling Practice and Pol-
icy, 3 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 55 (2012) (addressing question of whether the use
of loan out companies renders the sole company owner’s creative output works for
hire for copyright law purposes).
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in 17 U.S.C. § 203, but UMG has routinely and systematically re-
fused to honor them.  These refusals are made, in every instance, on
similar legal grounds, the first and foremost  of  which  is  UMG’s
position  that  the  sound  recordings created by recording artists
under contract with UMG (or its affiliated or predecessor compa-
nies) are “works made for hire,” and, therefore, not part of the sub-
ject matter of § 203.  UMG claims that the recordings are works
made for hire because of contractual language that is found in every
UMG recording agreement. As a result of UMG’s policy, UMG has
refused to acknowledge that any recording artist has the right to
take over control of the sound recordings or enter into an agree-
ment with a different label for the exploitation of recordings, after
the effective date of termination. In many instances, UMG has con-
tinued to exploit the recordings after the effective date, thereby en-
gaging in willful copyright infringement of the United States
copyright in those recordings.  As a result of UMG’s actions, UMG
has effectively stymied any chance that the class plaintiffs have of
entering into a new agreement with a third party, or even exploiting
the recordings themselves, as is their right. As a result, these actions
by UMG have effectively destroyed the very salability of the post-
termination rights in the recordings that the Copyright Act ex-
pressly guarantees.41
The “work for hire” assertion that was abandoned by the music com-
panies in the Victor Willis litigation is apparently the primary re-
sponse that Sony and UMG use to justify their refusals to
acknowledge termination notices for sound recordings. The compa-
nies apparently planned well ahead when they drafted contracts in the
late 1970s and early 1980s, using “work for hire” language in licenses
for just this thirty-five-years-in-the-future eventuality.  In fact, thirty-
five years later their prescience is notable. Meanwhile, the musicians
(and sadly, their representatives who negotiated licenses for them)
probably did not understand the ultimate end to which this language
was going to be deployed. Even if they had been aware of the work
for hire exemption from Section 203 termination rights, they might
not have believed that using the words “work for hire” in a written
agreement would magically transmogrify a work that was not a work
for hire under the applicable statutory provisions of the Copyright Act
into one that is.42 In 1999, record companies engineered the addition
of “sound recording” to the list of copyrightable work categories that
can potentially be works for hire if the other conditions are met. This
amendment to the Copyright Act was then quickly repealed. As Mary
LaFrance noted: “In late 1999, Congress amended the definition of
“works made for hire” in § 101 of the Copyright Act to make explicit
41. Waite v. UMG Recordings, Inc., No. 1:19-cv-01091, 2019 WL 469770, at 2–3
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2019).
42. See Mary LaFrance, Authorship and Termination Rights in Sound Recordings,
75 S. CAL. L. REV. 375 (2002); see also Chase A. Brennick, Termination Rights in the
Music Industry: Revolutionary or Ripe for Reform?, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 786 (2018).
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its intent to include sound recordings as a category of works eligible
for this status. The amendment was repealed with retroactive effect
less than a year later. All this happened—pardon the expression—in
record time.”43
The music at issue will only be deemed works for hire if Sony and
UMG can convince one or more federal judges either that the authors
of these sound recordings were employees, or that the songs fit within
one of the categories of works that can be works for hire when created
by an independent contractor with a writing that expressly states the
songs are works for hire. Proving that the authors were employees
may be difficult for Sony and UMG. As Ryan Vacca noted several
years ago, the most important “Reid factors” used to assess whether
someone is an employee for work for hire purposes weigh in favor of
authors of sound recordings as independent contractors, in part be-
cause they received advances and royalties rather than paychecks.44
Another commentator noted that they generally did not have health
insurance, retirement benefits, or even administrative support.45
Sony and UMG have a somewhat better shot at convincing a court
that independent contractors created the disputed songs as works for
hire. This approach requires a writing that says the songs are works
for hire, which the companies apparently finagled by inserting those
words into the licenses they persuaded the authors to sign, as ex-
plained above. However, it also requires proof that the works them-
selves were “specially ordered or commissioned for use as a
contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or
other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a
compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a
test, or as an atlas.”46 Some observers are dubious about this
prospect.47
However, Mary La France has argued that the music companies
may be able to convince a court that the sound recordings were a con-
tribution to a collective work, writing:
[A]s a matter of plain-language statutory interpretation, the typical
sound recording consists of multiple musical performances, and is
therefore “collective.” Thus, the “collective works” category is liter-
ally broad enough to include such sound recordings, even without
43. LaFrance, supra note 42, at 375.
44. Ryan Vacca, Work Made for Hire—Analyzing the Multifactor Balancing Test,
42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 197, 238–39 (2014).
45. Moral Rights, Termination Rights, Resale Royalty and Copyright Term: Hear-
ing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop. And the Internet of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 4 (2014) (statement of Casey Rae, Vice Presi-
dent for Policy and Education, Future of Music Coalition).
46. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); See also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, WORKS MADE FOR
HIRE 2 (2017) https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ30.pdf [https://perma.cc/QL79-
KMXT].
47. Brennick, supra note 42.
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any specific mention thereof in the legislative history. Accordingly,
there is a strong argument, based on the literal language of the stat-
ute, that the inclusion of “a contribution to a collective work” in the
list of works eligible for work-made-for-hire status makes the typi-
cal commercial sound recording eligible for such status.48
To quote her again: “[t]wo questions remain: First, under current law,
who is the author of a sound recording? Second, regardless of the an-
swer to the first question under current law, who should be the author
of a sound recording?”49 If federal courts presented with this issue
decide that Mary LaFrance is correct about the statutory meaning of
“collective works,” the music companies are the authors of numerous
commercial sound recordings. This would be the end of Section 203
termination rights for many sound recording artists. Answering the
second question brings us back to Lunney’s many useful insights in
Copyright’s Excess.
VI. APPLYING THE LUNNEY LENS
Echoing the introduction to Copyright’s Excess, the overarching
questions this part of the essay considers are: do Section 203 termina-
tion rights encourage the creation of new works? And do Section 203
termination rights promote the broader dissemination of existing
works of authorship?  Lacking the rich empirical data Lunney col-
lected, all that is reasonably possible is to sketch out some possible
answers and hope that someday Lunney or some other interested
party collects relevant information and crunches the numbers.
Initially, one seemingly obvious point still bears stating:  If authors
are unaware of their termination rights, those rights will have no im-
pact on their creative production whatsoever. Were termination rights
an incentive for more (or better) music for Victor Willis? Clearly not
because Victor Willis did not know they existed when he was writing
lyrics for songs that became wildly successful. He learned of them only
after marrying a lawyer who understood copyright law.50 The Copy-
right Office could launch an education campaign to inform authors
about termination rights.  Content holding intermediaries would
forcefully oppose this because they benefit tremendously from author
ignorance about this aspect of copyright law.
If authors feel confident that they can reclaim their copyrights
about thirty-five years after they license them away, this may provide
them with an incentive to create more works. Or it may not. If regain-
ing control of copyrights gives authors positive feelings about creating,
then maybe that will increase their enthusiasm for working.  But if all
it does is increase the money they receive for existing works, the effect
48. LaFrance, supra note 42, at 389.
49. Id. at 376.
50. Rohter, supra note 33.
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWR\6-1\TWR101.txt unknown Seq: 13 15-SEP-20 11:01
2020] SECTION 203 TERMINATION RIGHTS 35
on their output could be neutral or even negative. Lunney makes a
very convincing case in Chapter Five that in the context of sound re-
cordings, more money did not mean more music, and in Chapter Six
that more money actually meant less music in some cases. Alterna-
tively, if it appears to authors that Section 203 termination rights can
be exercised only after protracted and expensive legal battles, and
maybe not even then, they will not seem much like “rights” and will
not provide much in the way of incentives to authors at all.  Authors
who feel badly treated by licensees who attempt to deprive them of
their termination rights may even sour on the music industry and stop
creating new works altogether.
The dissemination analysis is more positive. If authors can predict-
ably and efficiently reclaim their copyrights using Section 203 termina-
tion rights, this almost certainly would lead to the broader
dissemination of existing works. After termination, authors can
choose different intermediaries to partner with, move from exclusive
to nonexclusive licenses, or engage in distributive acts themselves. Au-
thors can leverage their control of the copyrights in commercially suc-
cessful works to obtain support for less economically flourishing
works.
A third related concern is the effect of termination rights on the
companies that license the copyrights from authors. So far, Section
203 termination notices seems to bring out the worst in corporate con-
tent holding intermediaries. They are fighting savagely to avoid losing
control of commercially successful works and probably also over (so
far) unsuccessful works as well. In addition to aggressive litigation,
they also engage in dirty tricks, such as adding fake co-authors to cop-
yright registrations so that they can still have some control over works
that are the subjects of successful terminations.51 While there is no
reason to believe that abolishing Section 203 termination rights would
result in better treatment of authors, the negative impacts of fights
over termination rights need to be monitored.
A. The Special Case of Sound Recordings
Copyright’s Excess focuses on sound recordings, and Lunney sug-
gests that perhaps sound recordings should not even be copyrightable
in Chapter Seven. As explained above, recording artists who work col-
laboratively may have a more difficult time being recognized as au-
thors for the purpose of Section 203 termination rights than
composers and perhaps other categories of authors as well. Lunney
makes a persuasive case against sound recording copyrights, and if
Section 203 termination rights are not available to them, it is not clear
that commercial recording artists have much to lose if they are
abolished.
51. Gardner, supra note 37.
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VII. A COUPLE OF RECOMMENDATIONS AND A CONCLUSION
If the political will exists to provide authors with more robust termi-
nation rights, Congress should make them available sooner and make
the process of termination far simpler and easier to exercise. This sort
of change will do nothing to solve the problem Lunney identifies of
excess incentives for the most popular artists and may actually exacer-
bate the difficulty as authors who can count on revenue streams from
recaptured copyrights may be even less likely to produce new works.
It would, however, provide average or even marginal authors with
more incentives to create, if they believe that they will have an oppor-
tunity to get out from under unfavorable licensing agreements for un-
expectedly popular or “sleeper” works.
Alternatively, Congress can simply make already nonwaivable Sec-
tion 203 termination rights mandatory. It can amend the Copyright
Act to require that all copyright licenses lapse after some number of
years, and the copyrights automatically revert to the human authors or
their statutory heirs.52 This is not a radical proposition, though content
holding intermediaries will paint it as such. It is simply a means to
better effectuate the goal of returning copyrights to authors so that
they (or their statutory heirs) can predictably reap some of the re-
wards of their labors even after signing and enduring unfavorable
contracts.
Whatever path is chosen, some change needs to happen. What
Victor Willis endured to exercise his termination rights was deeply un-
fair. That multiyear, multicourt, multilawyer dispute diverted a lot of
time and money that could have been used more productively.  And
his case seems like a best-case scenario compared to the scorched
earth Waite et al v. Sony and BMG litigation.  If copyright law is going
to offer termination rights to authors, the copyright industries must
somehow be forced to stop thwarting the process. Lunney is correct
that radical reform of the Copyright Act is needed, and Section 203
termination rights provide a stunning example of why.
52. This is not intended as an endorsement of the Copyright Act’s “statutory
heirs” paradigm. “Statutory heirs” are very problematic construct, but that is a topic
for another day. See Tonya M. Evans, Statutory Heirs Apparent?: Reclaiming Copy-
right in the Age of Author-Controlled, Author-Benefitting Transfers, 297 W. VA. L.
REV. 119 (2016).
